top of page

Rebel Communication Strategies

I examine a wide range of non-violent communication strategies armed groups employ to convey political messages to various domestic and international audiences. In addition to my published work, I have several ongoing projects examining rebel communication strategies.

 

*** Please do not cite my unpublished work without permission. Please contact me at ilaydaonder@tamu.edu for manuscripts.

Shameless Plugs? Credit Claims Reduce the Survival Rates of Terrorist Organizations (with Nazli Avdan and Aaron M. Hoffman)

Under Review

__________

 

This study investigates the relationship between terrorist credit claims, government counterterrorism efforts, and group survival. The conventional wisdom suggests that credit claims threaten the survival of terrorist organizations by exposing them to counterterrorism operations by governments. Using data from the Extended Data on Terrorist Groups and Global Terrorism Database, we find that groups issuing credit claims are more likely to cease operations compared to those that remain silent. This relationship, however, can be attributed to counterterrorism responses only when multiple groups issue competing claims for the same attacks. Otherwise, credit-claiming organizations are no more likely to be stopped by government counterterrorism efforts than groups that do not issue credit claims. These findings underscore the role competition and outbidding play in shaping the relationship between credit-claiming and counterterrorism. While credit claims can expose terrorist organizations to government countermeasures, governments appear disinclined to act upon credit-claiming information unless competitive inter-group dynamics are at play.

Rebel Groups’ International Legitimacy-Seeking, Social Origins, and Forced Recruitment

In preparation for submission

__________

 

Existing research on rebel aspirations for international legitimacy suggests that such aspirations may deter rebel organizations from coercive practices that carry international reputation costs. However, the quest for international legitimacy might not straightforwardly deter forced recruitment practices. Unlike other coercive practices, such as indiscriminate violence against civilians, recruitment is not a mere tactical choice but a foundational requirement for organizational survival. The indispensable need for new recruits compels rebels to weigh their recruitment needs against their aspirations for international legitimacy and balance the imperative for survival against the potential for international backlash. I argue that pre-war social origins condition legitimacy-seeking rebels’ recruitment practices. Pre-war ties to civilian-led organizations enable rebels to overcome the difficulties in spreading their ideological messages at a mass scale while operating clandestinely and persuading a large number of potential recruits whose commitment may be too tenuous to volunteer for the rebel cause purely for ideological reasons. Coupled with aspirations for international legitimacy, this should successfully deter rebels from resorting to forced recruitment. Thus, rebel organizations that are best positioned to refrain from forced recruitment are those with both aspirations for international legitimacy and pre-war ties to civilian-led organizations. Using cross-national data on 115 rebel organizations, I find strong empirical support for this hypothesis. My work builds on the growing body of research on rebel groups’ engagement with international audiences, draws attention to the role of social origins in shaping future rebel practices, and implicates that the constraints they face in mobilizing voluntary recruits condition legitimacy-seeking rebel groups’ adherence to humanitarian laws.

Statements of Denial by Armed Actors and Public Perception of Government Credibility

Working Paper

__________

 

Politically-motivated armed actors frequently publish statements of denials of responsibility, disclaiming, disowning, or dissociating from a particular violent act. Statements of denial are contradictory to the logic of costly signaling that underpins scholarly research on organized political violence. If acts of political violence are meant to serve as costly signals, why would armed actors deny their involvement in violence? While existing literature suggests that statements of denial are aimed at avoiding public backlash, little attention has been given to examining whether announcements from potentially untrustworthy actors achieve their intended effect. Using a vignette survey experiment -run on a nationally representative sample of 2016 U.S. adults- describing a fictional attack, which the government officials attributed to a particular armed group, and randomizing whether the group denied, claimed, or remained silent about the attack, I present the first systematic evidence that statements of denial convince individuals that the armed group publishing the statement played no role in the attack. I further argue that these statements can be strategically employed to discredit the government. By refuting responsibility for an attack attributed to them by the government, armed groups cast public doubt on the government’s credibility. My findings demonstrate that statements of denial by armed groups erode the public perception of government credibility, while claims or silence by these groups tend to enhance it. These findings illuminate additional strategic incentives shaping armed groups’ public communication efforts and have implications for studying armed actors’ use of non-armed instruments to shape public opinion.

Terrorist Credit‑Claiming and Public Response to Terrorism (with James A. Piazza)

Working Paper

__________

 

Rebel Communication Strategies for Capitalizing on Women’s Participation (with Lindsey Goldberg)

Research in Progress

__________

 

Rebel Public Relations Dataset (RePReD)

Research in Progress

__________

 

bottom of page